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A. J. Stone, Q.C.*

The Common Law in the
Twentieth Century

1. Introduction
Comparing the judicial with the legislative approach to law-making
is the stuff of academic debate. I do not propose to enter upon that
debate in this short discussion, except to concede that each approach
has its strengths, each its weaknesses, and each its separate role. My
purpose is, rather, to examine the making of law by the judiciary as
it illustrates the inherent capacity of the common law for change and
for growth in a dynamic society.
This century has seen several extraordinary developments of the
common law in Canada, England, and the United States, the leading
example of which is in the area of liability for negligence. By
adopting the concept of a duty of care to one's neighbour in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 1 Mr. Justice Cardozo, of the New
York Court of Appeals, took a giant step away from the traditional
view of negligence causing loss to a third party who is not within the
contract relationship. In England, the same issue was dealt with, in
1932, in the landmark decision made by the House of Lords in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, 2 wherein Lord Atkin laid down the
principle of reasonable foreseeability that underlies the modem law
of negligence. When one considers that, a mere three years earlier,
as distinguished a legal scholar as Sir Frederick Pollock thought that
"it would take a bold man" to induce the House of Lords to reverse
the current of English authority, 3 the decision in Donoghue v.
Stevenson was momentous indeed. The preceding fifty years had
seen little growth in the English law of negligence, and in
recognizing the plaintiff's claim, the Law Lords gave the law a fresh
direction. That they well understood the broad implications of their
decision is clear from, for example, the judgement of Lord
Macmillan, in which he said:

*Justice of the Federal Court of Canada, Ottawa.
1. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1060.
2. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562.

3. Sir Frederick Pollock (1929) 45 L. 0. Rev. 421 at 422.
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What, then, are the circumstances which give rise to this duty to
take care? In the daily contacts of social and business life human
beings are thrown into, or place themselves in, an infinite variety
of relations with their fellows; and the law can refer only to the
standards of the reasonable man in order to determine whether
any particular relation gives rise to a duty to take care as between
those who stand in that relation to each other. The grounds of
action may be as various and manifold as human errancy; and the
conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to
altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of
judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing
circumstances
of life. The categories of negligence are never
4
closed.
In 1933, as our own law school was
fifty years, Vincent C. MacDonald, who
its many distinguished deans and, later,
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, saw

about to celebrate its first
was soon to become one of
an eminent member of the
the majority decision in

Donoghue v. Stevenson "in the larger view" as ".

.

an extremely

apt illustration of the inherent flexibility of the common law, which
in the hands of men of judicial valour and statesmanship is
periodically given fresh impetus and direction just when the rigid
rules of precedent seem to have 'cribbed, cabined and confined' it in
a blind alley.'

'5

It is not surprising that the law of negligence should have
remained static for so long, for the courts have always been mindful
of the need for certainty in the law. The legitimacy of the desire to
know the "rules of the game" so as to order personal and business
affairs is something with which few would quarrel, and the cliche
"old cases make good law" is but an expression of that desire. In
fact, a high degree of stability is built into the law by our rules of
precedent, whereby lesser courts are bound by the previous
decisions of higher courts on the same point and intermediate
appellate courts are bound by their own previous decisions. In the
short run, these rules tend to favour certainty over flexibility. If
conditions in society never changed, then that would be
unobjectionable, for there would be no need for the law to change.
However, conditions in society do change, and the pressure for
change in the law is directly related to the pace of change in society.
Whenever the law is slow to respond, a gap develops between what
the law is and what it should be. Deciding when and how to fill that
4. Supra, note 2at619.
5. Vincent C. MacDonald (1932) 10 Can. Bar. Rev. 478.
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gap is the task faced by the courts in dealing with the new fact
situations and relationships within a changing society. While, the
courts have, for the most part, discharged that task most admirably,
the desire for certainty in the law has often delayed recognition of a
need for change. The gap is then perpetuated and enlarged, until the
law is either altered by legislation or it comes under the scrutiny of a
court of "valour and statesmanship" that is willing and able to set it
right.
In the hands of such a court, the common law can be as infinitely
adaptable to a dynamic society as life itself. Indeed, the great jurists
have regarded our law as much more than simply a collection of
rules based in logic and designed for certainty. Rather, Maitland
declared that "law is the place where life and logic meet," and Mr.
Justice Holmes said that "the life of the law has been experience,
not logic." The need for the law to change and adapt with society
was also acknowledged by Mr. Justice Cardozo in these poetic
words:
The inn that shelters for the night is not
the journey's end. The law, like the traveller,
must be ready for the morrow. 6
Above all, the development of the law by the courts must be guided
by justice. Lord Denning expressed this in his own inimitable
fashion in the course of a public interview given a few years before
his retirement as Master of the Rolls in the summer of 1982, saying
that "some hold that the object of the law is to be certain, but I hold
that the object of the law is to be just."
Examples of the law being given "fresh impetus and direction"
may be found in the twentieth century, a period of great societal
change. I wish to examine three of the more outstanding examples,
namely, the dramatic changes made by the courts in the laws
regarding injunctive relief, liability for negligent misstatement, and
recovery of damages for pure economic loss.

II. The Mareva Injunction
The remarkable development of the so-called Mareva injunction
aptly illustrates the ability of the common law to change and to
march with the times. In England, the traditional view had been that
the interlocutory injunction would not be granted to restrain a
defendant from disposing of his assets out of, or removing them
6. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of Law (Yale University Press, 1924) at 20.
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from, the jurisdiction prior to judgment. The principle was one of
long standing, having had its genesis in Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, a
decision of the Court of Appeal. 7 In that case, Lord Justice Cotton
said that he knew "of no case where, because it was highly probable
that if the action were brought to a hearing the plaintiff could
establish that a debt was due to him from the defendant, the
defendant has been ordered to give security until that has been
established by the judgment or decree." 8 Lord Justice Lindley was
even more emphatic, stating that it would be a "very great mischief
if we were to stretch a sound principle" in the manner sought. 9 And
there the law stood for the next eighty years, until the decision of the
Court of Appeal in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis.'oIn that
case, the defendants, who had chartered several ships, failed to pay
the agreed charter hire, and the plaintiff's attempts at locating them
to collect payment were unsuccessful. Somehow, the plaintiff
discovered that the defendants had funds in London banks, and
fearing that the funds would be removed from the jurisdiction,
brought an ex parte application to restrain their disposition or
removal, by the defendants, from the jurisdiction. The decision of
Mr. Justice Donaldson, in which this application was refused, was
reviewed by the Court of Appeal, which, in a bold departure, held
that the relief should be granted on the ground that it was "just or
convenient" to do so. Confronting the issue head-on, the Master of
the Rolls, Lord Denning, stated that:
We are told that an injunction of this kind had never been done
before. It has never been the practice of the English courts to
seize assets of a defendant in advance of judgment, or to restrain
the disposal of them. We were told that Chapman, J. in chambers
recently refused such an application. In this case also Donaldson,
J. refused. We know, of course, that the practice on the continent
of Europe is different.
It seems to me that the time has come when we should revise
our practice. There is no reason why the High Court or this court
should not make an order such as is asked for here. It is warranted
by Section 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act 1925 which says that the High Court may grant a mandamus
or injunction or appoint a receiver by an interlocutory order in all
cases in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient to
do so. It seems to me that this is just such a case. There is a strong
7. Lister & Co. v. Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch. D. 1.

8. Id. at 13.
9. Id. at 15.
10. Nippon Yusan Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 3 All E.R. 282.
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prima facie case that the hire is owing and unpaid. If an
injunction is not granted, these monies may be removed out of
the jurisdiction and the shipowners will have the greatest
difficulty in recovering anything. Two days ago we granted an
injunction ex parte and we should continue it."I
In Mareva Campania Naviera SA v. InternationalBulkcarriers
SA, a1a
later case which was also decided in 1975, Mr. Justice
Donaldson declined to extend ex parte injunctive relief in an action
to collect unpaid charter hire and damages for repudiation of a
charter party, or to restrain the foreign defendants from removing or
disposing out of the jurisdiction monies standing to their credit at a
London bank. But on appeal, the Court of Appeal followed its own
decision in the Karageorgis case, and granted the relief. However,
it was not until Rasu Maritima SA v. Pertambangan1 3 that the same
court heard both sides in such a dispute, after which it gave its final
blessing to the Mareva injunction as it is now understood. Later
still, in Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine SA, 14
Lord Denning, who was concerned that the Mareva injunction "not
be stretched too far lest it be in endangered,"' 5 set forth certain
guidelines that are the bases on which it will be granted.
While the earlier English cases that were heard during the 1970s
were concerned with the presence in the jurisdiction of the assets of
foreign defendants, it was not long before the sweep of judicial
reasoning led to the granting of Mareva injunctions in cases where
the assets were those of a domestic defendant. Here the lead was
taken by Sir Robert Magarry V-C., in Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill. 16
In this case, the plaintiff claimed that he was owed the balance on
the transfer of leasehold property. In the course of litigation over the
claim, the plaintiff subsequently learned that the defendant was
abroad or was about to go abroad. Finding also that the premises
had been sold, the plaintiff, being fearful that the defendant would
remove all of his assets and live outside the country, sought an ex
parte injunction to restrain the defendant from removing the net
proceeds of the sale from the jurisdiction. There was evidence that
11.Id.at 283.
12. Mareva Compania Naviera SA, v. InternationalBulkcarriers SA, [1980] 1 All
E.R. 213.
13. Rasu Maritima SA v. Pertambangan, [ 1977] 3 All E.R. 324.
14. Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine SA, [1979] 2 All E.R.
972.
15. Id. at 984.
16. Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 3 All E.R. 190.
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the defendant had previously experienced financial difficulties and
had gone to live in the United States for a period of time. Sir Robert,
after taking the view "that the heart and core of the Mareva
injunction is the risk of the defendant removing his assets from the
jurisdiction and so stultifying any judgment given by the Court in
the action,' ' 1 7 could see no reason why that injunction "should be
confined to 'foreigners' in any sense of that term."' 18 Accordingly,
he granted the relief, noting in passing the decision of Mr. Justice
Robert Joff in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co.
SA, 19 wherein the defendant was allowed to use the assets that were
subject to the restraining order to pay debts as they came due.
Finally, in Prince Abdul Rahman Bin Turki Al Sudairy v.
Abu-Taha, 20 Lord Denning arrived at the same conclusion that Sir
Robert Magarry had in the Barclay-Johnsoncase.
Once the path had been blazed by the English Court of Appeal,
courts in other common law jurisdictions received word of the
Mareva injunction with equanimity. It was not long before the
courts in our own country began to grant injunctions of the same
sort, although some confusion was created in the process. In Chitel
and Anstalt v. Rothbart and Roprop Foundation Inc., 2 1 a decision
of the Ontario Court of Appeal, effort was made to inject some
order into the granting, in Ontario, of the Mareva-style injunction.
After an exhaustive review of the leading cases, which Associate
Chief Justice MacKinnon acknowledged was "not necessary to my
decision," he agreed that "the Mareva injunction is here and here to
stay" 22 and would function as an exception to the general rule
against prejudgment relief only when there was a risk that the
defendant's assets would be removed from the jurisdiction before
judgment, and only in narrowly defined circumstances. In his
decision, he stated that:
The applicant must persuade the court by his material that the
defendant is removing or there is a real risk that he is about to
remove his assets from the jurisdiction to avoid the possibility of
17. Id. at 194.

18. Id.
19. Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A.,[1980] 1 All E.R.
480.
20. Prince Abdul Rahman Bin Turki Al Sudairy v. Abu-Taha, [1980] 3 All E.R.

409.
21. Chitel and Anstalt v. Rothbart and Roprop Foundation Inc., [1983] 39 O.R.
(2d) 513 (C.A.).
22. Id. at 534.
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a judgment, or that the defendant is otherwise dissipating or
disposing of his assets, in a manner clearly distinct from his usual
or ordinary course of business or living, so as to render the
tracing of the assets remote, if not impossible
possibility of future
23
in fact or in law.
With this, enough has been said about the Mareva injunction,
except to note that after eighty years, during which the law stood
virtually unchanged, the English courts once again demonstrated the
inner strength and ability of the common law to afford an
appropriate remedy in the face of changing circumstances and
conditions. As Lord Denning put it in the Rasu Maritima SA case,
the facts presented to the court "called aloud" for judicial
intervention. 2 4 Even more remarkably, the Mareva injunction had,
within a mere five years, been extended to prevent removal and
disposition of assets of a domestic defendant, as it had been
extended to prevent removal of assets of a foreign defendant in
circumstances where it is evident that failure to grant relief would
end in "stultifying" or "sterilizing" any judgment that the plaintiff
may obtain. The remedy has become such standard practice in
Canada that it is now being expressly provided for in the rules of
practice of our courts, as, for example, in Rule 40.03 ("Injunction
for Preservation of Assets (Mareva Injunction)") of the Supreme
Court of New Brunswick's Rules of Practice.
III. Negligent Misstatement
The manner in which the common law of negligence has developed
in respect of negligent misstatement over the past thirty years
provides another striking example of the inherent adaptability of
common law. Although the impetus for change had its seeds in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, it was not until the celebrated dissent of
Lord Justice Denning in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., 2 5 in
which the traditional view of the law was challenged, that a new
direction was set. Before investing in a corporation, the plaintiff
asked to see the accounts which had been prepared by the defendant
firm of chartered accountants. In due course, the plaintiff received
the accounts and, on the strength of their accuracy, decided to
invest. It was clear that the defendants knew that the accounts would
23. Id. at 533-34.
24. Supra, note 13.
25. Candlerv. Crane, Christmas& Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164.
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be passed to the plaintiff. In fact, the accounts contained numerous
false statements and presented a misleading picture of the financial
state of the corporation, which became defunct within a year and
resulted in the plaintiff losing his investment. His action against the
firm of chartered accountants was dismissed, both by the trial judge
and by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that, while the financial
statements were false, they were not fraudulent and, accordingly,
the defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff with whom they had no
contractual or fiduciary relationship.
This case aptly illustrates the reluctance of some courts to look
beyond traditional solutions in existing law, and to examine the
merits of those solutions while seeking new ones that would be
appropriate in light of contemporary conditions. The old law on
which this case was grounded was found in a line of cases that
began with LeLievre and Dennes v. Gould.2 6 In that case, a
surveyor who did work for a building owner issued certificates
which informed the owner of the amounts he had to pay to the
builder. The owner showed the certificates to his mortgagees, who
advanced money, relying upon these certificates rather than upon
the certificate of their own surveyor. The certificates, it turned out,
had been negligently prepared, and led the mortgagees to seek
redress of their loss from the surveyor. The case was dismissed both
by the lower court and by the Court of Appeal, where the prevailing
view of the law was set forth by the Master of the Rolls, Lord Esher,
as follows:
No doubt the defendant did give untrue certificates; it was
negligent on his part to do so, and it may even be called gross
negligence. But can the plaintiffs rely upon negligence in the
absence of fraud? The question of liability for negligence cannot
arise at all until it is established that the man who has been
negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to make him
liable for his negligence. What duty is there when there is no
relation between the parties by contract? A man is entitled to be
as negligent as
he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no
27
duty to them.
In Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., the majority view of the
Court of Appeal was that a distinction existed between negligent
misstatement, on the one hand, and negligent circulation or repair of
chattels, on the other, and that this distinction had not been
26. LeLievre and Dennes v. Gould, [ 1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
27. Id. at 497.
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abolished by the decision of the House of Lords in Donoghue v.
Stevenson. Lord Justice Denning, dissenting, took a decidedly
different view, invoking statements of principle "made by some of
the great names in the law," 28 from Lord Eldon to Lord Atkin, and
then pointing to the divided opinions in "the great cases which have
been milestones of progress in our law," 29 adding that:
On the one side there were the timorous souls who were fearful of
allowing a new cause of action. On the other side there were the
bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so required. It
was fortunate for the common law that the progressive view
prevailed. Whenever this argument of novelty is put forward I
call to mind the emphatic answer given by Pratt, C.J., nearly two
hundred years ago in Chapman v. Pickersgill when he said: "I
wish never to hear this objection again. This action is for a tort:
torts are infinitely various; not limited or confined, for there is
nothing in nature but may be an instrument of mischief." The
same answer was given by Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v.
Stevenson when he said: "The criterion of judgment must adjust
and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The
categories of negligence are never closed." I beg leave to quote
those cases and those passages against those who would
emphasize the paramount importance of certainty at the expense
of justice. It needs only a little imagination to see how much the
common law
would have suffered if those decisions had gone the
30
other way.
He then proceeded to hold that the chartered accountants owed a
duty to use care in their work not only to their own clients, with
whom they had contracted, but to any third party to whom they
showed their accounts and reports or to whom they knew that their
clients were going to show them, when the accountants knew that
the person would consider their accounts and reports with a view to
investing or taking other action to his gain or detriment. Lord
Asquith, reflecting the majority view, saw his duty as that of simply
recording "the existing state of the law," and added that if this view
rendered him "to the company of 'timorous souls'," then "I must
face that consequence with such fortitude as I can command.' '31
And so the law stood, as it had for almost sixty years, until the
House of Lords reviewed the principle fourteen years later in Hedley

28. See, supra, note 25 at 176.
29. Id. at 178.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 195.
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Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. 32 In that case, the
plaintiff asked its bankers to inquire into the financial stability of a
company on whose behalf they were about to incur a contractual
debt. These bankers, in turn, made inquiries of the company's own
bankers, who gave favourable references but stipulated that they
were "without responsibility". In relying upon these references,
the plaintiff incurred a debt, resulting in a loss for which it sued the
company's bankers. The defence succeeded on the narrow ground
that the "without responsibility" disclaimer protected the defendants. Throughout their speeches, the Law Lords stressed the
importance of Donoghue v. Stevenson in the development of the law
of negligence. Lord Devlin, in particular, saw the law rather as a
living organism. He commented upon that case and Lord Atkin's
speech in the following terms:
What Lord Atkin did was to use his general conception to open a
category of cases giving rise to a special duty. It was already
clear that the law recognized the existence of such a duty in the
category of articles that were dangerous in themselves. What
Donoghue v. Stevenson did may be described either as widening
of an old category or as the creation of a new and similar one.
The general conception can be used to produce other categories in
the same way. An existing category grows as instances of its
application multiply until the time comes when the cell divides
• . . As always, in English law, the first step . . . is to see how
far the authorities have gone, for33new categories in the law do not
spring into existence overnight.
On the main issue of whether a cause of action lay in favour of the
plaintiff for the loss he suffered as a result of the defendants'
misstatement of the company's financial stability, a majority of the
House of Lords was under no doubt. They overruled Candler v.
Crane, Christmas & Co. and laid down a new principle of law,
which stated that a negligent, though honest, misrepresentation,
whether spoken or written, may give rise to a cause of action in
damages for financial loss that was caused by it apart from any
contract or fiduciary relationship. The basis for this principle was
that the law will imply a duty of care when a party who seeks
information from a party who is possessed of special skill trusts him
to exercise due care, and when that party knew or ought to have
known that reliance would be placed on his skill and judgment. In
32. Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & PartnersLtd., [1964] A. C. 465.
33. Id. at 524-25.
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other words, where the issuer of a negligent misstatement should
have reasonably foreseen that a person in the position of the plaintiff
would rely upon it to his detriment, he will be held liable for that
person's damages. The Hedley Byrne principle, as it has come to be
known, has been adopted by our courts, including the Supreme
Court of Canada, which applied it in Wellbridge Holdings Ltd. v.
The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg and Walter
Machinery & Equipment Ltd., 34 Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington
Iron Works, 35 and Haig v. Bamford. 36 In this last case, which

involved a claim made against some chartered accountants by a
third party plaintiff, the Supreme Court also took account of the
"increasing growth and changing role of corporations in modem
society" and the "new perception of the societal role of the
profession of accounting.'
'37

38
More recently, in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council,

the existence of a duty of care in a particular situation was once
again canvassed by the House of Lords, in light of Donoghue v.
Stevenson and subsequent cases. Lord Wilberforce summarized the
governing principles as follows:
Through the trilogy of cases in this House - Donoghue v.
Stevenson . . ., Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners
Ltd. . . . and Dorest Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office . . ., the

position has now been reached that in order to establish that a
duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to
bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations
in which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question
has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether,
as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has
suffered damages, there is a sufficient relationship of proximity
or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of
the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause
damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of care
arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it
is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit, the scope of the
duty or the class of person to whom
it is owed or the damages to
39
which a breach of it may give rise.
34. Wellbridge Holdings Ltd. v. The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater
Winnipeg and Walter Machinery & Equipment Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 957.
35. Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, [1974] S.C.R. 1189.
36. Haig v. Bamford, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 466.
37. Id. at 475.
38. Arms v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728.
39. Id. at 751-52.
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In the second principle expressed here, the House of Lords might
appear to be indicating a desire to draw back from the broad
principles that were laid down and to accomplish this by allowing
the courts, in particular cases, to deny recovery, despite the
existence of a prima facie duty of care, but when, for policy reasons
not fully articulated, recovery should be denied. Some assurance
that the House was not intending to abridge the great principle of
Donoghue v. Stevenson may be found in its most recent decision in
Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. ,40 where Lord Roskill
repudiated the merest suggestion that the law, as it stood before
1932, should be resurrected. He stated that:
It was powerfully urged on behalf of the appellants that were your
Lordships to so extend the law, a pursuer in the position of the
pursuer in Donoghue v. Stevenson . . . could, in addition to
recovering for any personal injury suffered, have also recovered
for the diminished value of the offending bottle of ginger beer.
Any remedy of that kind, it was argued, must lie in contract and
not in delict or tort. My Lords, I seem to detect in that able
argument reflections of the previous judicial approach to
comparable problems before Donoghue v. Stevenson was
decided. That approach usually resulted in the conclusion that in
principle the proper remedy lay in contract and not outside it. But
that approach and its concomitant philosophy ended in 1932 and
for my part I should be reluctant to countenance
its re-emergence
41
some 50 years later in the instant case.
The law had come a long way indeed from the days of Winterbottom
v. Wright. 4 2 In that case, Chief Baron Abinger regarded as quite
"absurd and outrageous" a suggestion that a mail coach driver,
who was injured while employed by the Postmaster-General as a
result of the coach upsetting due to a construction defect, should be
entitled to recover damages against its supplier. "If the plaintiff can
sue," he said, then "every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach,
might bring a similar action." Lord Buckmaster had that case, and
particularly the view of Baron Alderson, 43 very much in mind in
preparing his dissenting speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson when he
' 44
asked "If one step why not fifty?
40. Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd., [1982]3 W.L.R. 477.
41. Id. at 493.
42. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109.

43. Id.at 115.
44. Supra, note 2 at 577.
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The Junior Books case was principally concerned with the
recoverability of damages for pure economic loss, and the
developments in that branch of the law in this century are a subject
to which I now turn. Again they illustrate the ability of the common
law to adapt and to grow with experience as its guide, and so to
meet the needs of an ever-changing society.
IV. Damagesfor Economic Loss

The progress of the common law in the difficult area of the
recoverability of damages for pure economic loss has been
hesitating and, at times, even tortured. But the point has now been
reached where it can be confidently stated as a general proposition
that damages for direct economic loss, whether or not they are
coupled with damages for physical loss, are recoverable under
English common law. That important principle aside, the
development of the law on this point owes a good deal to Canadian
judges and to Canadian courts, and illustrates a willingness on their
part to strike out on their own when the common law is found to be
in need of new direction.
In order to appreciate the true significance of the change wrought
on the law in this area, it is once again desirable, in keeping with
Holdsworth's admonition that those wishing to understand the law
have "the patience to read its history", to examine the law that
preceded the change. Again, we find that it extended back well into
the nineteenth century, which was also the period of the great
Industrial Revolution in England. A good example of the view that
45
prevailed is to be found in Cattle v. Stockton Watervorks Co.,
where Mr. Justice Blackburn thought that wages that were lost by a
group of miners upon the negligent flooding of a mine should not be
recoverable in an action founded upon that negligence. That view
held for many years, until, in Canada in 1959, it began to break
down under the scrutiny of a judge who was not prepared to apply it
in a particular case. That case was Seaway Hotels Ltd. v.
Consumer's Gas Co. 46 There, an electric cable was accidentally
severed, due to the negligence of the defendant's employee and in
the course of his employment. As a result, the plaintiff hotel owners
lost rental revenue from guest rooms and from the operation of the
hotel's bar and eating facilities. As it was summertime, another
45. Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., [1875] L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 at 457.
46. Seaway Hotels Ltd. v. Consumer'sGas Co., [ 1959] O.R. 177.
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consequence of the negligence was the sloiling of food in the
plaintiff's electrically operated refrigerator. If the old law had been
applied, the results would have been predictable: there could be no
recovery of the lost revenues. But Mr. Justice McLennan, clearly
uncomfortable with that prospect, fell upon the simple fact of the
physical loss of the spoiled food and proceeded to allow it as well as
the economic loss that was represented by the lost revenues. The
device was both clever and convenient. It had the effect of inching
the law forward, within very narrow limits, and opening the gate
ever so slightly but not so much as to invite a flood. In addition, the
Court of Appeal agreed. 47
When the same point came up for decision in England in Weller
& Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute,'4 8 a case in
which no physical loss was suffered, recovery was denied. It was
again denied in similar circumstances in Electrohome Ltd. v. Welsh
Plastics Ltd.4 9 There was fear that to extend the principle to cover
the recovery of pure economic loss that was not coupled with some
physical loss would be to "throw open the floodgates", and judges
were not prepared to take that step, meritorious though a particular
claim might appear from the standpoint of justice. This fear lay at
the base of the English Court of Appeal's decision in S.C.M.(United
Kingdom) Ltd. v. W. J. Whittal and Son Limited, 50 where Lord
Denning, given the circumstances of that particular case, could not
bring himself to allow the claim, preferring instead to apply the
exclusionary rule enunciated in the Seaway Hotels case. He rested
his decision upon public policy, saying that the "risk should be
borne by the whole community who suffer the losses rather than rest
upon one pair of shoulders," even while admitting that "there is not
much logic in this, but still it is the law." 5 1 Three years later, when
the point again came before him in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v.
Martin & Co. (Contractors)Ltd., 52 Lord Denning held fast to this
view, but seemed troubled, for he added that "the more I think
about these cases, the more difficult I find it to put each into its own
47. [1959] O.R. 581.
48. Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute, [1966] 1 Q.B.
569.
49. Electrohome Ltd. v. Welsh PlasticLtd., [ 1968] 2 All E.R. 205.
50. S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W. J. Whittal and Son Limited, [1971] 1

Q.B. 337.
51. Id. at 344.
52. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., [1973] 1
Q.B. 27.
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proper pigeon-hole. Sometimes I say: 'There was no duty.' In
others I say: 'The damage was too remote.' So much so that I think
the time has come to discard those tests which have proved so
elusive. It seems to me better to consider the particular relationship
in hand, and see whether or not, as a matter of policy, economic
loss should be recoverable. '153 Lord Justice Edmund Davies,
dissenting, would have allowed the claim for economic loss,
"provided that it was a reasonably foreseeable and direct
consequence of failure in a duty of care." 54 Yet the capacity of the
common law to respond, even in the hands of a judge with the
breadth of vision of the Master of the Rolls, seemed here to fail.
There was work yet to be done.
The question was next taken up by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works and Walkem
Machinery & Equipment Ltd. 55 While using a crane on its chartered

log barge, the plaintiff noticed that it was defective and removed it
from operation in order to repair it. Both the distributor and the
designer and manufacturer of the crane were joined as defendants,
for both were well aware of the type of defect, since it had been
found in other cranes of the same design and manufacture. Yet both
had failed to warn the plaintiff, who sued not just for the cost of
repairs but also for the revenues that were lost due to the barge being
immobilized during the period of repair. A majority of the Supreme
Court allowed the claim for economic loss, but only on the basis
that it was "the direct and demonstrably foreseeable result of the
breach of that duty" 56 to warn of the defect in the crane of which
the defendants were aware after it was put into circulation. Mr.
Justice Laskin also allowed the claim but was not content with the
basis of "independent tort" upon which the majority rested its
decision. His logic is unassailable. He asked why the plaintiff
should have been entitled to recover if his economic loss had been
accompanied by physical injury, yet be denied recovery when his
economic loss was incurred by an action that was taken by him to
avoid threatened physical injury. He stated this, in his reasons for
judgment, as follows:

53. Id. at 37.
54. Id. at 45.
55. Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works and Walkem Machinery &
Equipment Ltd., [1974] S.C.R. 1189.
56. Id. at 1215.

The Genius of the Common Law 707

It is foreseeable injury to person or to property which supports
recovery for economic loss suffered by a consumer or user who is
fortunate enough to avert such injury. If recovery for economic
loss is allowed when such injury is suffered, I see no reason to
deny it when the threatened injury is forestalled. Washington can
be no better off in the latter case than in the former. On the
admitted facts, a crane or other person's barge, of similar design
to that installed on the appellant's barge, had collapsed killing its
operator. It was when this fact came to its notice that the
appellant took its crane out of service. Its crane had the same
cracks in it that were found in the collapsed crane, and they were
due to the same faulty design in both cases. Here then was a piece
of equipment whose use was fraught with danger to person and
property because of negligence in its design and manufacture;
one death had already resulted from the use of a similar piece of
equipment that had been marketed by Washington. I see nothing
untoward in holding Washington liable in such circumstances for
economic loss resulting from the downtime necessary to effect
repairs to the crane. The case is not one where a manufactured
product proves to be merely defective (in short, where it has not
met promised expectations) but rather one where by reason of the
defect there is a foreseeable risk of physical harm from its use and
where the alert avoidance of such harm gives rise to economic
loss. Prevention of threatened harm resulting directly in
economic loss should not be treated differently from post-injury
cure. 57
He also regarded the cost of repairs to be recoverable as economic
loss.
However, in his view of the proper basis upon which to rest
recoverability of economic loss, Mr. Justice Laskin stood virtually
alone (only Mr. Justice Hall concurred). Two years later, in
Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Limited v. Cummer-Yonge Investments
Ltd., 58 Mr. Justice Pigeon took the view that the Rivtow decision
stood for the broad proposition "that recovery of economic loss
caused by negligence is allowable without any recovery for property
damage." ' 59 Some confusion followed. For example, in Gypsum
CarrierInc. v. The Queen et al, 60 Mr. Justice Collier of the Federal
Court of Canada accepted the broad proposition, while in Bethlehem

57. Id. at 1222.
58. Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Limited v. Cummer-Yonge Investments Ltd.,
[1976]2 S.C.R. 221.
59. Id. at 252.
60. Gypsum CarrierInc. v. The Queen et al, [1978] 1 F.C. 147.
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Steel v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, 6 1 his brother, Mr. Justice
Addy, applied the exclusionary rule that pure economic loss is not
recoverable, even if foreseeable, where it is not accompanied by
actual or threatened physical damage to person or property. More
recently, in Attorney-Generalfor Ontario v. Fatehi6 2 (which is now
pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada), Madame Justice
Wilson of the Ontario Court of Appeal, for herself, summed up the
present state of Canadian law in the following observations:
I have concluded from a review of the leading English and
Canadian authorities that, while Canadian courts have made
greater inroads into the exclusionary rule than the English courts,
there has been no dramatic movement away from it despite the
observations of Mr. Justice Pigeon in the Agnew-Surpass case,
supra. I say this because the majority in Rivtow, supra, found it
necessary to base recovery on the existence of an independent
tort, breach of the duty to warn arising from the special
relationship between the parties, and Laskin J. required a threat
of physical damage to person or property. None of the Court
seems to have been prepared to go as far as Lord Justice Edmund
Davies in his dissenting judgment in the Spartan Steel case,
supra, and permit recovery of the economic loss as a direct and
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defect in the design or
manufacture of the crane. In cases where there are no
independent tort and no threat of physical damage the
exclusionary rule would seem to be still very much alive in
Canada. 63
The scene of the developments in this area of common law then
shifted back to England and to the decision of the House of Lords in
the Junior Books case. 64 The plaintiff, who had had a factory built
for their business in Grangemouth, Scotland, claimed against a
sub-contractor for damages arising from the need to relay the
concrete floor, which turned out to be defective when cracks
appeared in it shortly after it was laid. In addition to the cost of
relaying the floor, the plaintiff also claimed for the cost of storing
books off of the premises, for the cost of moving machinery, for lost
profit due to temporary closure of the business, for wages to be paid
to employees who could not do their jobs, for overhead, and for the
costs of its investigation into the defective work. The Scottish courts
allowed the claims in economic loss. In agreeing, the House of
61. Bethlehem Steel v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, [1978] 1 F.C. 464.
62. Attorney-Generalfor Ontario v. Fatehi (1981) 34 0.R. (2d) 129.

63. Id. at 140.
64. Supra, note 40.
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Lords carefully reviewed the entire question against the background
of the law of negligence as developed by the courts in England and
the Commonwealth, from Donoghue v. Stevenson onward. Their
review included Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners
Ltd., 65 where a majority of the House of Lords seemed willing to
allow a claim for economic loss even in the absence of physical
injury. Against the plaintiff's claim were marshalled the views of
eminent jurists, beginning with Chief Justice Cardozo's oft repeated
dictum in UltramaresCorporationv. Touche, 66 fearing exposure to
"liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class",67 and which Lord Fraser characterized as
the "floodgates argument".68 Lord Roskill wrote the leading
judgment, in which he carefully examined the relevant cases in both
England and the Commonwealth, including the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Rivtow case. In his judgment, he preferred the
"powerful dissenting judgment" of Mr. Justice Laskin to the
judgment of the majority. After noting that "in the instant case there
was no physical damage to the flooring in the sense in which that
phrase was used" 6 9 in some of the earlier cases, Lord Roskill
proceeded to dismiss the appeal and to uphold the judgment in
favour of the plaintiff for its claim in pure economic loss, taking as
his guide the principles of recoverability of damages in negligence,
laid down by Lord Wilberforce in the Anns case. He said that:
I think today the proper control lies not in asking whether the
proper remedy should lie in contract or instead in delict or tort,
not in somewhat capricious judicial determination whether a
particular case falls on one side of the line or the other, not in
somewhat artificial distinctions between physical and economic
or financial loss when the two sometimes go together and
sometimes do not - it is sometimes overlooked that virtually all
damage including physical damage is in one sense financial or
economic for it is compensated by an award of damages - but in
the first instance in establishing the relevant principles and then
in deciding whether the particular case falls within or without
those principles. To state this is to do no more than to restate
what Lord Reid said in Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office and
Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.
65. Supra, note 32.
66. UltramaresCorporationv. Touche (1931)174 N.E. 441.

67. Id. at 444.
68. Supra, note 40 at 482.

69. Id.
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Lord Wilberforce . . . enunciated the two tests which have to be
satisfied. The first is "sufficient relationship of proximity", the
second any consideration negativing, reducing or limiting the
scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the
damages to which a breach of the duty may give rise. My Lords,
it is I think in the application of those two principles that the
ability to control the extent of liability in delict or negligence lies.
The history of the development of the law in the last 50 years
shows that fears aroused by the floodgates argument had been

unfounded.

70

And he added that:
During the argument it was asked what the position would be in a
case where there was a relevant exclusion clause in the main
contract. My Lords, that question does not arise for decision in
that instant appeal, but in principle I would venture the view that
such a clause according to the manner in which it was worded
might in some circumstances limit the duty of care just as in the
Hedley Byrne case the plaintiffs were ultimately defeated by the
defendant's disclaimer of responsibility. But in the present case
the only suggested reason for limiting the damage (ex hypothesi
economic or financial only) recoverable for the breach of the duty
of care just enunciated is that hitherto the law has not allowed
such recovery and therefore ought not in the future to do so. My
Lords, with all respect to those who find this a sufficient answer,
I do not. I think this is the next logical step forward in the
development of this branch of the law. I see no reason why what
was called during the argument "damage to the pocket"
simpliciter should be disallowed when "damage to the pocket"
coupled with physical damage has hitherto always been allowed.
I do not think that this development, if development it be, will
lead to untoward consequences.71
It will be noted that the particular case was concerned with direct
economic loss, rather than with indirect economic loss to third
parties, as was pointed out by Lord Roskill when he described the
relationship between the parties as being "as close as it could be
short of actual privity of contract."72 Nevertheless, while the case
may be seen by some as revolutionary in its scope, the concept itself
was, in fact, not new to the law. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
had accepted it almost two decades earlier in Santor v. A & M
74
Karagheusian,Inc. 73 (Compare, also, Seely v. White Motor Co.)
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494-95.
Id. at 494.
Santor v. A & M. Karagheusian,Inc. (1965) 44 N.J. 52.

74. Seely v. White Motor Co. (1965) 45 Cal. Rptr. 17.
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And so, in the Junior Books case, as in earlier English and
Canadian cases, we find yet another example of the ability of the
courts to reform the common law, unaided by the legislature. We
see also the way in which that is accomplished. Change came
slowly, but the courts brought it about by following a step-by-step
process. Mr. Justice Vincent MacDonald would, I am confident,
approve, for his great faith in the "inherent flexibility" of the
common law was once again borne out. One might chance to
speculate that Lord Denning, now in retirement, might also nod in
agreement, even though he was unable to reject the exclusionary
rule against recovery of damages for pure economic loss in his own
decisions as Master of the Rolls.
V. Summary

What I have endeavoured to illustrate here is the capacity of the
common law to be adapted to new conditions, thereby providing
new and better answers either in the place of old ones or where
answers (and even the questions themselves) had not existed before.
This is the genius of the common law. Whether the process be
labelled "administering justice according to law", as it is in the
words of Viscount Simonds, 75 or simply "doing justice", as it is
viewed by Lord Denning, 76 is not so important as the process itself.
Lord Atkin, in Donoghue v. Stevenson, considered that the law of
negligence should accord "with sound common sense" , 77 and Lord
Macmillan was of the view that it should be consonant "with justice
and common sense". 78 Almost one hundred years earlier, Lord
Esher wrote, in Emmens v. Pottle, that "any proposition the result
of which would be to shew that the Common Law of England is
wholly unreasonable and unjust, cannot be part of the Common Law
79
of England."
The common law is far from being a perfect instrument of
reform, and those who know it well know its limitations as well as
its possibilities. On the whole, it serves society reasonably well,
sometimes tilting against reform and thereby inviting legislative
intervention, and at other times changing profoundly and with
75. Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446 at 468.
76. See, for example, Denning, The Discipline of Law (Butterworth, 1979) Part

Seven.
77. Supra, note 2 at 599.
78. Id. at 621.
79. Emmens v. Pottle (1885) 16 0.B.D. 354 at 357-8.
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unexpected swiftness. As an example of the latter, we need only to
look at the remarkable development of the Mareva injunction. Not
to be overlooked are the practical limitations on those who
administer, as well as those who seek, justice. On a day-to-day
basis, the courts must be primarily concerned with settling disputes,
rather than with matters of high principle. And it is the litigants who
must bear the expense.
I have given but a few examples to illustrate the point of this
discussion, but these could easily have been multiplied. The
dramatic changes in the common law in our own century speak well
of its capacity, and of the capacity of the courts, to carry out this
creative process. It would be unfortunate if the law stood still, or
even if it were to be too slow to change, for as was so eloquently
pointed out by Lord Denning, one of the great reform-minded
judges of our time:
What is the argument on the other side? Only this: that no case
has been found in which it has been done before. That argument
does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which
has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law
will stand still whilst the rest of the world goes on - and that will
80
be bad for both.
Certainly the courts of our own century have not left the law to stand
still in a changing world, but have changed and developed it. And
that has been good for both.
80. Packer v. Packer, [1954] p. 15 at 22.

